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ABSTRACT: This article provides an in-depth, longitudinal analysis combining
real-time and retrospective data on a set of Mondragon’s industrial cooperatives that
are organized as international groups. We examine the life cycle of these international
cooperative groups, which is expected to evolve differently to that of small- andmedium-
sized cooperatives that operate exclusively on a local scale. The article is theoretically
informed by the cooperative life cycle theory, as well as by recent insights from the
degeneration and regeneration theses. Our analysis yields an intricate picture of the
evolution of cooperatives faced with a ‘grow-or-die’ dichotomy. On the one hand, our
findings reject the highly simplistic and deterministic view of the degeneration thesis by
demonstrating that these cooperatives can mobilize resources to revitalize cooperative
values and practices. On the other, we find that regeneration may not occur in a con-
sistent, sequential fashion as the previous literature suggests, but rather degenerative
and regenerative tendencies can occur simultaneously, even leading to long-lasting,
unresolvable situations. In light of this, the article asks future research to draw on
power-aware and politically informed approaches for further understanding of how
cooperatives manage the tensions at each organizational stage of their life cycle, and
of which organizational actors benefit, and how, from reversing some degenerative
tendencies while maintaining others intact.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the internal changes and
organizational trajectories experienced by member-based organizations; that is, ‘orga-
nizations that on principle rely on the equal status and democratic participation of their
members to reach their goals’ (Jaumier 2017, p. 218). As noted by Rothschild (2016),
collectivist-democratic forms of organization, which include, among others, self-help
groups, micro-credit groups, cooperatives, and social movement organizations, have
proliferated over recent years, posing a growing alternative to hierarchical and bu-
reaucratic forms of organization. In this context, some recent studies have challenged
the orthodox view of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy which asserts that ‘[o]rganization
implies the tendency to oligarchy’ (Michels 1915: 26), both by revisiting the concept
of oligarchy in the light of different democratic and oligarchic distributions of power
across organizational forms (Leach 2005, Diefenbach 2018), and by illustrating how var-
ious forms of democratically structured organizations can resist oligarchization (Martin
2015).
In particular, cooperatives have attracted prominent attention, with several au-
thors bringing back longstanding debates on degeneration and regeneration. According
to Storey et al. (2014), analysis of cooperatives in a capitalist setting has been tradition-
ally dominated by the degeneration thesis, which holds that cooperatives must adopt the
same forms and priorities as capitalist firms if they are to survive in the market, and as
a result will gradually become dominated by an oligarchy (Cornforth 1995: 488). Thus
cooperatives are expected to follow a life cycle that concludes with either commercial
failure or their progressive degeneration and eventual transformation into capitalist
firms (Webb and Webb 1921, Meister 1984). This perspective still shows signs of hege-
mony. Various studies suggest that growing economic requirements and managerialism
trends associated with a competitive market economy and a neoliberal ideology have
permeated many cooperatives, imposing unavoidable pressures towards degeneration
(e.g. Cathcart 2013; Paranque and Willmott 2014).
Other authors have focused on the processes and conditions that lead cooperatives
to retain their egalitarian democratic functioning over time and avoid degeneration,
highlighting their ability to balance the conflicting logics and aims of market-embedded
demand for organizational efficiency on the one hand, and culturally-embedded values
for inclusive engagement and democracy on the other (Varman and Chakrabarti 2004,
Hernandez 2006, Langmead 2016, Jaumier 2017). In addition, a smaller but growing
line of research has highlighted cooperatives’ potential to regenerate; that is, to revive
cooperative values and re-assemble democratically-structured forms of decision making
as a reaction to degeneration (e.g. Ng and Ng 2009, Diamantopoulos 2012, Giagnocavo
et al. 2014, Storey et al. 2014, Narvaiza et al. 2017). These studies illustrate how coop-
eratives can regenerate by mobilizing resources to trigger organizational change, such
as by reinforcing a culture of discussion and open criticism and strengthening members’
active participation.
While this literature provides essential contributions, we still lack comprehen-
sive understanding of the various degenerative and regenerative tendencies that occur
within cooperatives and other member-based organizations (Jaumier 2017, Narvaiza
et al. 2017). Indeed, as Diefenbach (2018: 15) recently claimed, ‘[h]ow, and especially
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why, some of these organizations work and are successful in keeping their character
as democratic organizations over many years is somewhat underexplored and under-
researched’. In this article, we provide a longitudinal study of a set of Mondragon’s
industrial cooperatives that have struggled for decades to develop successfully in in-
ternational markets while utilizing democratic methods. The relevance of this analysis
is supported by the fact that globalization pressures have confronted many coopera-
tives with a ‘grow-or-die’ dichotomy: if they are to survive in increasingly globalized
markets, they must internationalize in order to maintain their competitiveness (Bretos
and Marcuello 2017). Indeed, mounting empirical research has documented the inter-
nationalization of cooperatives (e.g. Bretos et al. 2018a). While international growth
is a prerequisite for many cooperatives to remain competitive, on the other hand this
process might compromise their long-held values and institutionalized practices (Flecha
and Ngai 2014, Bretos et al. 2018b).
More specifically, we contribute to advancing understanding of the cooperative life
cycle in two main ways. Firstly, while the previous literature has generally examined
degenerative and regenerative tendencies in small- and medium-sized cooperatives that
operate exclusively at a domestic level, our article examines these processes in large
cooperatives competing on a global scale and controlling a range of subsidiaries. Sec-
ondly, unlike the previous literature, which tends to depict regeneration as a consistent
and homogeneous process that permeates the organizational structures and dynam-
ics of the cooperative, we show that regeneration can take place in a partial fashion;
that is, with some organizational dynamics and practices reverting while others remain
intact.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section lays its theoretical foundations
by briefly reviewing the cooperative life cycle theory; the third section details the re-
search methods and the data; the fourth discusses the main results of our research, and
the final section provides some concluding remarks.
2 The cooperative life cycle theory
The emergence of neo-institutionalism in the late 1970s was an important mile-
stone in understanding the existing homogeneity of organizational forms and practices,
that is, why organizations tend to resemble one another (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977,
DiMaggio & Powell 1983). According to neo-institutional theory, organizations tend to
‘become isomorphic with their institutional context in order to signal their social fit-
ness and gain legitimacy in the eyes of critical constituencies’ (Greenwood et al. 2008:
4). It is argued that this process is driven by three types of isomorphic pressures: (1)
coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legiti-
macy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and
(3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization (DiMaggio and Powell
1983).
The question of isomorphism in cooperatives has aroused controversial debate
since the end of the nineteenth century. When studying the evolution of British
cooperative societies, the Webbs observed a reduced degree of survival among these
enterprises and concluded that the few organizations that had managed to survive
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Figure 1 – Stages of the cooperative life cycle.
Source: Own elaboration.
had quickly collapsed as ‘democracies of producers’ and turned into ‘associations of
capitalists’ (Webb and Webb 1921). The Webbs’ statement inaugurated the well-known
‘degeneration thesis’, which experienced notable development, fundamentally during
the 1970s and 1980s (see, among others, Ben-ner 1984, Meister 1984, Miyazaki 1984,
Russell 1984). Following the landmark study by Cornforth et al. (1988), three main
degenerative dynamics can be distinguished in cooperatives. Firstly, constitutional
degeneration involves cooperatives adopting capitalist forms of organization in which
employees are excluded from the rights and benefits of cooperative membership.
Secondly, organizational degeneration implies that employee involvement in decision
making is diminished in favor of control by a managerial elite or technocracy. Thirdly,
goal or cultural degeneration entails the prevalence of the conventional business goals
of profit seeking and growth over socially-oriented targets.
According to the degeneration literature, cooperatives and other democratic or-
ganizations tend to experience a life cycle, marked by the deterioration of their partic-
ipatory structures and the growing heterogeneity in members’ preferences. Four ma-
jor stages have been distinguished to depict how degeneration evolves in a sequen-
tial fashion: conquest, economic consolidation, coexistence, and administrative power
(Meister 1984, Rosner 1984, Cornforth 1995, Chaves and Sajardo 2004, Cook 2018).
This gradual process would eventually result either in the dissolution of the coopera-
tive or in a process of isomorphism with the dominant institutional environment (see
Figure 1).
In the first stage, conquest, the cooperative has just been created, usually by a
small group of members who join to meet their common economic, social, and cultural
goals through a jointly-owned organization. Members’ idealism and commitment are
high, and democracy is essentially practised on a direct basis, with decisions being
made in the assembly and the notable involvement of all members of the organization.
The governing bodies are not yet well defined, and the cooperative’s economic activity
and functions are poorly established (Meister 1984, Rosner 1984). The second stage,
economic consolidation, comprises a period of transition during which, if the coopera-
tive survives, conventional principles of organization are adopted and further economic
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consolidation is achieved. Initial idealism is overshadowed by indifference and apathy
and the power of management is strengthened, giving rise to growing conflict between
idealists and practical-minded managers (Meister 1984, Cornforth 1995). In the third
stage, coexistence, symptoms of degeneration become apparent. Market values perme-
ate the cooperative and are accepted by the members at the expense of radical ideals
and social goals. Direct democracy is diluted and decision-making power becomes re-
stricted to a representative board, giving rise to a greater gap between managers and
other members as growth and efficiency concerns are addressed with greater division of
labor and role specialization. Economic activity, decisions and information for members
become increasingly complex. While the size of the organization usually increases, in
contrast the members’ criticism and control decrease, and social activities are aban-
doned or become marginal (Rosner 1984, Cornforth 1995). During the fourth stage, of
administrative power, economic logics dominate and members and their representatives
lose their power as control is completely assumed by the managers (Chaves and Sajardo
2004, Meister 1984).
The degeneration literature contends that this four-stage process may eventually
result in one of the following two options: (i) the cooperative is dissolved and exits the
industry as the organization no longer serves to achieve the members’ initial objectives;
or (ii) the cooperative experiences isomorphism, either by morphing into some other
organizational form, usually as an investor-owned firm better-suited to the interests
and preferences of the management and other members, or by falling into a state of
inaction in which the business is run healthily but social values and ideals are dormant
(Cornforth et al. 1988, Cook 2018).
This four-stage framework, however, has been criticized by a number of authors
who suggest that cooperatives are able to maintain their original nature in the long
term, and that degeneration may be a temporary stage followed by the setup of re-
generation processes with the power to restore their democratic, participative social
functioning (Batstone 1983, Rosner 1984, Hunt 1992, Cornforth 1995). This body of re-
search, labeled the ‘regeneration thesis’, claims that the life cycle of cooperatives does
not conclude with degeneration but may lead to a fifth developmental stage, regen-
eration, in which democracy is reinvented. This stage basically involves recognition
and repositioning. Members collectively recognize a decline in the quality of democratic
practice within the organization and trigger various processes to reaffirm the initial
values and ideals, reconstitute social goals, and reignite cooperative practices. This
stage does not usually involve a total return to the direct democracy initially prac-
tised but rather takes the form of more conventional forms of worker representation,
reflecting the increase in the organizational size of the cooperative and the organiza-
tional changes described above. However, the management power of the technostructure
is clearly curbed, and the interests of labor are reinforced at the expense of those of
capital.
In the last few years renewed debate has emerged about the life cycle of coopera-
tives. Some studies have focused on the growing degenerative tendencies of cooperatives
seeking to survive in a global market economy. These include the technocratization
of management (Chaves and Sajardo 2004), the emergence of oligarchic trends that
displace democracy and grassroots participation (Heras 2014, Paranque and Willmott
2014), the embracement of market values and corporate discourses that privilege
managerial interests (Cathcart 2013, 2014, Heras and Basterretxea 2016), and the
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transformation of cooperatives into investor-owned firms (Sousa and Herman 2012).
Some authors also illustrate how severe competitive pressures and adverse economic
conditions may lead cooperatives to cease operations altogether and exit the industry
(Errasti et al. 2017). Other studies, meanwhile, have demonstrated that cooperatives
and other member-based organizations can resist degeneration and achieve a healthy
balance between oligarchy and democracy by both maintaining their original nature in
the long term and revitalizing their democratic functioning over time (Ng and Ng 2009,
Storey et al. 2014, Narvaiza et al. 2017). A variety of mechanisms are highlighted,
including the reenactment of a democratic discourse that countervails the dominant
market rhetoric (Eikenberry 2009); the reproduction of an active membership through
careful selection of managers and workers and their socialization into cooperative
values (Chaves and Sajardo 2004); the permanent requirement for accountability and
endless overt critique of managers to circumvent the coalescence of power in their hands
(Jaumier 2017); the organization of labor to reinforce a participatory culture grounded
in self-determination, horizontality and solidarity (Hernandez 2006); connection to
wider social movements to promote community-based goals (Diamantopoulos 2012,
Langmead 2016), and the eventual ‘remutualization’ of cooperatives (Sousa andHerman
2012).
However, we argue that two factors are critical to further advancing our under-
standing of the cooperative life cycle. Firstly, research to date has generally examined the
evolution of small- and medium-sized cooperatives operating exclusively at a domestic
level (e.g., Varman and Chakrabarti 2004, Hernandez 2006, Ng and Ng 2009, Lang-
mead 2016, Jaumier 2017, Narvaiza et al. 2017), where degenerative and regenerative
tendencies tend to occur in an informal way, largely depending on the role of individual
leaders (Ng and Ng 2009, Narvaiza et al. 2017). These tendencies are expected to evolve
differently in large cooperatives operating on a global scale with a range of foreign sub-
sidiaries. Here, international growth might impose unique degenerative pressures on
formal and informal democratic structures and processes and open up a wider range
of regeneration strategies (Bretos and Marcuello 2017). The few studies dealing with
international cooperative groups in this field have focused on the degenerative dynamics
triggered by the acquisition or setting-up of non-cooperative offshoots, and the possibil-
ities of regeneration through the ‘cooperativization’ of these capitalist firms (Flecha and
Ngai 2014, Bretos and Errasti 2016, 2017). However, what is lacking is a wide-ranging
analysis that takes into account the life cycle of international cooperative groups over a
long time span.
Secondly, much of the early literature appears to depict regeneration as a con-
sistent, homogeneous process that ‘breathes life back into cooperative ideals’ (Batstone
1983: 150), leading the cooperative to a new organizational stage in which the previous
structural, cultural, and organizational dynamics of degeneration are fully overcome
(e.g. Batstone 1983, Rosner 1984, Hunt 1992). Some more recent studies conceptualize
cooperatives as paradoxical spaces in which members permanently struggle to find a
balance between competing market and social demands (Hernandez 2006, Ng and Ng
2009, Storey et al. 2014, Narvaiza et al. 2017). This implies that cooperatives might tend
to conduct processes of partial regeneration, reverting only to certain organizational dy-
namics and practices while others remain unaltered so that the cooperative can continue
to exploit resources drawn from market logics.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Research approach
To address the questions raised above we designed an in-depth, longitudinal case
study (Yin 1984) informed by a ‘process view’, which puts the spotlight on the centrality
of time by examining ‘how and why things emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over
time’ (Langley et al. 2013: 1, see also Langley 1999). Process questions ‘are fundamental
for gaining an appreciation of dynamic social life, and developing and testing theories
of “how” social entities adapt, change, and evolve over time’ (Van de Ven 2007: 145),
and have been widely used to shed light on complex processes of organizational change
(Langley et al. 2013). This method appears especially suited to understanding why
cooperatives degenerate and regenerate, and how these organizational processes evolve
over time.
Our theoretic approach combines inductive theory generation and deductive theory
verification (Orton 1997), a mixed approach that ‘allows one to gain creative insight from
the data, without necessarily denying or reinventing concepts that have been useful
previously’ (Denis et al. 2001: 812). We assumed that cooperative life-cycle theory could
be useful to make sense of our empirical observations and at the same time, we expected
our findings to enrich our knowledge about the degenerative and regenerative dynamics
of cooperatives.
3.2 Empirical context
The setting for our study was the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (MCC), a
network that comprises about 270 organizations and 75,000 workers worldwide in the
areas of industry, education-knowledge, retail, and finance. MCC is based in the Basque
Country, a region that boasts one of the most developed Social Economy sectors in Spain
(Bretos and Morandeira 2016). MCC’s Industrial Division consists of 68 worker coop-
eratives, of which about half are organized as international groups controlling a total
of 140 subsidiaries in more than 20 countries. These organizations engage in very di-
verse economic activities including industrial automation, construction, household appli-
ances, automotive components, machine tooling, and industrial equipment (Mondragon
2017).
The study examines in detail the cases of Fagor Ederlan, Maier Group, and Fagor
Electrodomesticos. We selected these cooperatives because they offer varied insights
into the life cycle of cooperatives. In 2013, Electrodomesticos, Mondragon’s flagship
group, declared bankruptcy after 57 years of operation. Before its collapse it employed
nearly 11,000 workers at 18 plants across Spain, France, China, Poland, Morocco, and
Italy (Errasti et al. 2016, 2017). Ederlan, a leading supplier to the automotive industry
employing about 3,800 workers at 18 production settlements in Spain, Mexico, China,
Brazil, and Slovakia, came into being in 1963 and today stands out as one of MCC’s most
active cooperatives in terms of the design and implementation of regeneration initiatives,
including the conversion of capitalist subsidiaries into cooperatives at the domestic
level (Bretos and Errasti 2016, 2017), and some efforts to introduce the cooperative
model in its foreign subsidiaries (Bretos et al. 2018, 2019). Maier was founded in 1975
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and specializes in the manufacturing of automobile plastic components and injection
moldings. Today the company employs 3,200 workers at 10 plants in Spain, the UK,
the Czech Republic, Italy, China, Mexico, and India. Maier is currently embarked on an
ambitious process of international expansion and has recently opened factories in India,
China, and Mexico.
3.3 Data sources
Real-time and retrospective longitudinal data were collected via semi-structured
interviews and from archival sources. The information gathered covers the period from
the very formation of the Mondragon Cooperative Experience in the 1950s to 2018. As
noted by Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009), this data combination is ideal for understanding
the sequence and flow of events, as retrospective data enable the efficient gathering of
more observations, while real-time data mitigate any retrospective bias and allow for
finer-grained tracking, improving understanding of how events evolve over time (see
also Leonard-Barton 1990).
We collected a wide range of archival documents fromMondragon including histor-
ical records about its early years, annual reports, strategic plans, internal presentations
and documents, corporate videos, press releases, in-housemagazines, published research
articles, and information from corporate websites. These documentary and archival data
were particularly useful for building a context-sensitive, historically grounded case (Yin
1984) and capturing the Mondragon cooperatives’ initial developmental stages.
The study also relies on 45 semi-structured interviews: 17 interviews were con-
ducted at Electrodomesticos during 2014, with 18 at Ederlan between 2013 and early
2017, and 10 at Maier between 2015 and late 2016. The interviews were carried out at
cooperative headquarters and some domestic plants and lasted 90 minutes on average.
Our informants included top managers, such as an HR director and a managing di-
rector; middle-ranking managers, generally from the production and HR departments;
representatives of the cooperative governing bodies; rank-and-file worker-members; and
salaried and temporary employees. The interviewees were asked to report important
events, actions, and behaviors in the history of their cooperative from its inception until
the present. Some relevant questions addressed how they perceived the evolution of
their cooperative in terms of the reshaping of its culture and values and the transforma-
tion of its governance structures and participation mechanisms. They were also asked
to elucidate the reasons behind and consequences of the extensive growth that these
cooperatives have pursued throughout their history, and how their corporate discourse
and practices of regeneration have evolved over the last years.
3.4 Data analysis
The data analysis followed common prescriptions for longitudinal case studies
(Yin 1984, Langley 1999), and involved a two-step procedure. In the first stage, we re-
constructed the history of Mondragon’s cooperatives by organizing the case-study data
into an event history database which collated the descriptions of events chronologically
based on the raw interview and archival data (Karra et al. 2006). This permitted the
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Table 1 – Critical events in the development of Mondragon’s international cooperative
groups
Approximate
dates/period Key events and issues
1956–1970 Emergence and initial development of most of Mondragon’s international
cooperative groups. Rapid organizational and economic consolidation.
1970–1990 Extensive growth in the domestic market and associated tensions
surrounding democratic governance and worker participation.
1978–1983 Impact of the Spanish economic crisis. Further organizational consolidation
through the development of new policies to withstand recession situations.
1986 Spain enters the European Union. Arrival of multinational enterprises with
more innovative and efficient processes.
1991 Creation of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation holding structure to
promote cooperative activity and synergies in the fields of
internationalization, R&D initiatives, investment, financing, training, and so
on.
1990–2000 Start of the international expansion of most of Mondragon’s international
cooperative groups. Intensification of economic and productive
requirements. Escalation of various degenerative pressures and tensions.
2000–2002 Beginning of ideological discussions and internal reflections within several
large cooperatives oriented towards revitalizing the cooperative culture
and practices.
2003–2008 Collective recognition of the erosion of the cooperative culture and
emergence of vigorous debate about the future of the Mondragon
Cooperative Experience. Formalization of regeneration guidelines and
initiatives by both the MCC and cooperative firms.
2008–2013 Impact of the economic crisis. Partial abandonment of the regeneration
discourse and practices in various cooperatives to focus on economic
survival.
2013 Bankruptcy of the household appliance manufacturer Fagor
Electrodomesticos.
2015–present Revival of the regeneration debate, but reshaped by both the MCC and its
first-tier cooperatives, particularly regarding the cooperativization of
subsidiaries.
construction of a narrative about the emergence and organizational development of
Mondragon’s cooperatives in various important periods of change (see Table 1). These
periods do not necessarily represent homogeneous, static stages that take place sequen-
tially, but should be rather understood as dynamic stages that are mutually shaped and
intertwined in a multidirectional fashion, enabling ‘explicit examination of how actions
of one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in the next’ (Denis
et al. 2001: 815).
In the second stage, we documented and tracked the critical events that had led to
organizational changes in the cooperatives and how these changes were reflected in the
organizational structures, processes and culture.Wemoved iteratively between data and
theory rather than in a linear fashion, until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached (Ozcan
and Eisenhardt 2009). Throughout the process, triangulation of individual respondents’
accounts with those of other respondents and with the archival data allowed us to
mitigate informant biases and refine our emerging interpretations (Yin 1984). This
produced a synthesis anchored both theoretically in the literature and empirically in
our data (Karra et al. 2006).
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4 Research findings: The life cycle of Mondragon’s international cooperative
groups
4.1 Initial development and flourishing of Mondragon cooperatives (1956–1990)
The Mondragon cooperative movement flourished more than 60 years ago in the
Mondragon valley (Gipuzkoa, Basque Country) in a postwar context marked by poverty,
miserable income, unemployment, and appallingworking conditions (Molina andMiguez
2008). From its beginnings, Mondragon was a project anchored in the basic needs of the
local community, which founded a technical training school, nowMondragon University,
in 1943; the industrial cooperative Ulgor in 1956, which became Fagor Electrodomes-
ticos; the cooperative savings bank Laboral Kutxa in 1958, and the Lagun Aro social
security system in 1959. These four branches launched dozens of cooperatives and were
the seeds of what is today the MCC. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s some of
the most important cooperatives that are now international cooperative groups were
founded, including Ulma (1961), Fagor Ederlan (1963), Copreci (1963), Orona (1964),
Cikautxo (1971), and Maier (1975).
Inspired by the Catholic social doctrine of the priest Jose´ Marı´a Arizmendiarrieta,
ideologue of the Mondragon Cooperative Experience, these cooperatives began as small
democratic organizations grounded in a robust model of collective self-governance with
deep roots in the territory and a powerful sense of community. Most were created by
small groups of foundingmembers, based on values such as solidarity, hope and sacrifice,
and on the notion that all of the workers were partners, financiers and co-owners of the
company (Molina 2012). For example, Fagor Electrodomesticos was founded by five
young workers and former students of Mondragon Technical College (Tkacz et al. 2015).
Other cooperatives, such as Ederlan, were created by no more than 30 members imbued
with these ideas of social transformation (Fagor Ederlan 2013).
The transition from the first organizational stage (conquest) to the second stage
(economic consolidation) of the cooperative life cycle was relatively brief for most of
Mondragon’s international cooperative groups. Significant organizational structuring
and complexity were quickly achieved. Electrodomesticos was created in 1956 and
its bylaws were developed in 1959 by Arizmendiarrieta and the founding directors
(Ormaechea 2003), leading to the creation of its basic governance structures: the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Governing Council, the Social Council, and theManagement Council.
This cooperative also devised some of the basic organizational and financial policies that
characterize Mondragon, including the absence of stockholders, distribution of profits
among members, a reserve fund, the limitation of wage differentials, and an open-door
policy. Although Mondragon’s basic principles were not formally approved until 1987,
this set of ideas and practices were highly influential and were widely adopted by the
cooperatives that followed (Whyte and Whyte 1991). The creation of the second-level co-
operative organization ULARCO by Fagor Electrodomesticos, Fagor Arrasate, Copreci
and Fagor Ederlan in 1965 was an important first attempt to coordinate the activities
and resources of individual cooperatives and create mechanisms of inter-cooperative
solidarity (Barandiaran and Lezaun 2017).
The Mondragon cooperatives rapidly achieved notable economic consolidation, es-
pecially because in those years the Spanish domestic market absorbed all the production
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that the cooperatives offered (Cancelo 1999). This was initially favored by the protec-
tionist policies of Spain’s autarchic economy under Franco’s dictatorship, which isolated
the domestic market from foreign competition, and then by the unprecedented expan-
sion of the Spanish economy during the 1960s and early 1970s. These circumstances
prompted the cooperatives’ early and steady expansion. The number of workers at Mon-
dragon cooperatives increased by about 1,000 per year between 1965 and 1975 (Bradley
and Gelb 1987): Ederlan’s workforce increased from 275 to 683 between 1965 and 1969
(Altuna 2006a). Other cooperatives experienced similar growth; for example, the indus-
trial cooperative Copreci expanded from 16 jobs when it was founded in 1963 to nearly
700 by 1969 (Taylor 1994). The case of Fagor Electrodomesticos is particularly impres-
sive: by 1969, its factories employed 2,559 workers (Altuna 2006b), more than 30 per
cent of the total workforce of the 44 Mondragon cooperatives in existence at the time.
It is clear that the Mondragon cooperatives far exceeded their founders’ expectations
in terms of growth, employment, and economic success. A founding member of Ederlan
recalled:
We would never have thought that the cooperative would develop as it has and
become as big as it is today. We, the founding members, never would have believed
that.Wewere thinking of a cooperative of 200 or 300 people [ . . . ] taking into account
[the size of] other companies in the area. We thought we could be a little bigger or
smaller than [the cooperatives] that were then in Aretxabaleta or Eskoriatza. (Fagor
Ederlan, 2013, 02:32)
However, between the late 1970s and early 1980s a severe crisis hit the Spanish
economy. Mondragon’s cooperatives were not untouched, and some suffered financial
losses and discontinued some of their activities, although most exhibited notable re-
silience due to several factors. First, themarked international orientation of some helped
them to offset the sharp drop in domestic demand.While in 1970 exports byMondragon’s
industrial division slightly exceeded 11 per cent of total sales (Cancelo 1999), by 1980
cooperatives such as Electrodomesticos, Copreci, Fagor Ederlan, and Ulma were export-
ing about 70 per cent of their production through commercial networks via agents and
distributors in Europe and Latin America. Furthermore, Mondragon’s cooperatives de-
vised new organizational and financial policies to weather the economic crisis, including
the creation of an unemployment insurance system, the relocation of workers to other
cooperatives, the creation of the Intercooperative Solidarity Fund, and changes to inter-
nal profit distribution to increase the collective reserve (Bradley and Gelb 1987, Tkacz
et al. 2015).
The rapid growth of various Mondragon cooperatives’ size and organizational com-
plexity led to the emergence of early tensions between their social and business perspec-
tives, as the cooperatives combined management authority and Tayloristic methods of
work organization on the assembly lines with the development and reinforcement of
important social practices including pay equity, decision making on a one-person, one-
vote basis, and representation of worker-members’ concerns through a system of social
councils (Whyte and Whyte 1991, Taylor 1994). The largest Mondragon cooperatives
had entered the third organizational stage of the life cycle, coexistence, evidencing some
initial symptoms of degeneration. Already a technostructure had been created by pio-
neering directors, sustained by charismatic links with early worker-partners (Molina
2012), who emphasized the need to put decision-making power in the hands of those
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with greater expertise and specialized skills. Other members advocated broad-based
participation in policymaking and on the shop-floor beyond the existing representative
democracy. Workers participated in the General Assembly and elected members to the
governing and social councils, but there was a general feeling that they were being ex-
cluded from important decision-making and the daily organization and management of
work. There was widespread discontent on the assembly lines due to the high workload
stemming from authoritarian management and growing pressure for greater productiv-
ity (Taylor 1994).
A lively discussion emerged during the late 1970s and the 1980s about how
decision-making processes that were efficient and at the same time congruent with
democratic principles could be devised, which led some cooperatives to rethink the role
of their rank-and-file workers in their organizations’ day-to-day management. The So-
cial Council governing body was reinvented, and programs redesigning the organization
of work were introduced with the aim of promoting shop-floor workers’ participation in
decision-making (Whyte andWhyte 1991), which can be seen as early efforts to revitalize
workplace democracy. Copreci was one of the pioneering companies that experimented
with new forms of work organization and sociotechnical design. Between 1972 and 1984,
its assembly lines were reorganized from a function base to a product base, and man-
agement committees and semi-autonomous work groups were introduced (Taylor 1994).
Similar changes were subsequently adopted by other cooperatives, and by 1983 about
80 semi-autonomous work groups were actively operating in Mondragon’s largest coop-
eratives (Whyte and Whyte 1991).
4.2 Degenerative pressures in a ‘grow-or-die’ dichotomy (1990 onwards)
The initial degenerative pressures that Mondragon cooperatives faced in the early
years have intensified extraordinarily since the late 1980s with increased market com-
petition deriving from the global restructuring of the economy. ManyMondragon cooper-
atives have been compelled to adapt their technological and productive processes to the
new competitive requirements, enhance their management knowledge and skills, and
expand in Spain and abroad to maintain their competitive edge and protect cooperative
employment and operations in the Basque Country:
At that time it was increasingly evident that the company was not big enough to be
competitive. Our direct competitors were multinationals [ . . . ]. There were moments
of tension because we were working at full capacity and were barely able to meet
existing orders [ . . . ], but at the same time we were fully aware that it was necessary
to acquire a global dimension not only to be competitive abroad but also to continue
growing here and secure our jobs. (Interview, Maier manager)
Our fieldwork identified various constitutional, organizational, and cultural de-
generative tendencies. Mondragon’s cooperatives have experienced degenerative ten-
dencies at the constitutional level based on the annexation of capitalist forms of or-
ganization and restrictions to membership rights. Between the 1960s and 1980s they
acquired Basque firms, whose workers were absorbed as cooperativemembers. However,
in the early 1990’s these cooperatives started to acquire large companies, first in the
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domestic market and then abroad, maintaining them as capitalist subsidiaries.1 This ex-
pansion strategy has provided theMondragon cooperatives with extraordinary economic
results and job creation rates. For example, Fagor Ederlan Group’s workforce increased
from 1,300 to 3,600 workers between 1999 and 2015, and Maier Group’s workforce rose
from about 800 in 1999 to 2,700 in 2015. However, the contradiction lies in the fact
that workers in the capitalist subsidiaries do not enjoy the same rights as cooperative
members of the parent companies: they do not share in the ownership, distribution of
profits, and management of their enterprises. Most Mondragon’s international coopera-
tive groups have more salaried employees than cooperative members on their books. In
2007, as at Maier and Electrodomesticos, only 36% of the Ederlan Group were worker-
members; overall, the proportion of non-worker-members in the Mondragon group as a
whole rose from 14% in 1991 to 70.5% in 2007 (Heras and Basterretxea 2016).
There are also clear symptoms of degeneration at the cultural level, reflected in
members’ growing lack of commitment to cooperative principles and values and the
abandonment of some social targets in favor of business goals seeking profit and growth.
The intensification of global competition has ledmanyMondragon cooperatives to profes-
sionalize their management. The creation in 1984 of Otalora, Mondragon’s management
and cooperative training center, already reflected the largest Mondragon cooperatives’
growing need for managerial expertise in an increasingly complex and changing market
environment. Since then, many Mondragon cooperatives have hired external managers
who are more committed to efficiency than to the cooperative culture and social objec-
tives:
A great challenge inMondragon lies in the process of acculturation to the cooperative
model by new people, not only managers but also workers [ . . . ]. I myself came from
the conventional business world. I knew the cooperative world because here it is
very widespread. But it is not the same when you’re inside: you have to get used
to a culture, to values of democracy and cooperation, which are very different from
those that rule out there. (Interview, middle-ranking manager, Maier)
The prevalence of a ubiquitous businesslike rhetoric that privileges the interests
of competitiveness, growth, and customer/client orientation at the expense of reinforc-
ing social discourses and the achievement of community-oriented objectives is evident
(Taylor 1994). This rhetoric has facilitated a gradual distortion of cooperative values such
as solidarity, participation, and education. The transformation of cooperative training
and education for worker-members has played a key role. Since the 1990s, education
about the philosophical, political, and practical aspects of the cooperative movement
has been secondary to the benefits of technical training and basic formal training about
Mondragon’s basic cooperative principles (Cheney 2002). Several of the rank-and-file
workers interviewed had distanced themselves from these latter and the corporate poli-
cies of self-management and participation in management, stressing that job security
was the element that they valued most in their organizations (see also Heras 2014). This
1 Whereas Copreci was the first cooperative to set up a production plant abroad in 1989
(Mexico), most Mondragon cooperatives started their foreign direct investment strategy in the
mid-1990s. Electrodomesticos established its first foreign subsidiary in Morocco in 1994, while
Maier did so in the United Kingdom in 1999, and Ederlan in Brazil in 2001.
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is clearly exemplified by a Maier worker who was asked about the reasons behind his
recent incorporation as a cooperative member:
I think job security is the most important point. In a recession context, the coopera-
tive has kept going. There have been some improvements to our working conditions,
and we feel that our jobs are non-negotiable. (Interview, Maier worker)
Various factors have also triggered organizational dynamics of degeneration,
grounded in the reshaping of the nature and scope of worker participation in Mondragon
cooperatives. First, the greater organizational size of cooperatives and the complexity
of strategic decisions that must be taken have been key factors affecting participation.
Several members recognized a certain ritualization of the General Assembly and other
democratic spaces, remarking that they had become symbolic spaces rather than struc-
tures where people really participated:
It’s obvious that the bigger you are, the harder it is to encourage people’s active par-
ticipation [ . . . ]. It becomes more difficult for people to perceive a direct and tangible
relationship between their participation and the impact of such participation on the
organization. (Interview, Ederlan worker-member)
The transformations in the organization of work that began in the 1970s evolved
significantly throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, with the complete reconfiguration
of activities and processes towards customer orientation and the introduction of prevail-
ing models of total quality management (TQM) and lean manufacturing (Cheney 2002).
One critical aspect of this involved various industrial cooperatives’ implementation of
the ‘mini-company’ system in the early 2000s. This system restructures the organiza-
tion so that each of its units runs as a small firm in which semi-autonomous groups of
workers take decisions and resolve problems related to their area of work. The introduc-
tion of these management programs was not exempt from tensions in the cooperatives
deriving from the greater workload and stress in the workshops (see Kasmir 1996 for
detailed accounts of working lives in the cooperatives during these years). These models
inculcated a weak self-management culture that promotes forms of manager-controlled
participation assessed in terms of employees’ motivation and commitment to managerial
objectives (see also Cheney 2002, Heras 2014). Indeed, workers generally emphasized
their perception of a clear division between management and rank-and-file members,
stressing a certain discontent about their involvement in decision making.
No cooperative has entered the fourth stage of the life cycle, administrative power,
characterized by the technostructure’s absolute organizational control. This is evident
even in the case of Electrodomesticos, which preserved the essence of its cooperative
nature until its demise in November 2013, at least to the extent that the major decisions
were formally taken by the cooperative governance bodies in accordance with internal
procedures of representative democracy (Errasti et al. 2016). It is evident that the co-
operative’s bankruptcy was due to market conditions. Electrodomesticos, a weak and
small company in comparison to its competitors and with a large part of its production
activity located in high-cost countries, pursued a breakneck, risky strategy of growth
that reached its peak with the takeover of the French giant Brandt for €165 million in
2005. The company finally collapsed with the severe economic downturn of 2008, which
particularly hit the construction industry and in turn the electric appliance market,
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after steadily accumulating debt and a drastic fall in sales during the previous decade
(Errasti et al. 2017). Fagor Electrodomesticos also had a range of serious governance
problems. Important factors included the deficient flow of information between man-
agement and worker-members; the complex strategic issues that the cooperative faced
in an increasingly international and competitive environment, which clearly surpassed
worker-members’ strategic and business skills; the lack of effective leadership; and in-
creasing apathy and indifference among worker members who left the decision-making
power in the hands of management. This was the view of an Electrodomesticos worker:
There was a distancing and even a break between the governing bodies, which
increasingly had more weight, and the rank-and-file members. This circumstance
worsened with the purchase of the Brandt andWrozamet companies, since decisions
no longer depended on us. We lost control and the responsibility was diluted. (Naiz,
2013, press article)
What the case of Fagor tells us about the cooperative life cycle is that intrinsic
elements of theMondragon cooperativemodel, including worker ownership, job stability,
solidarity, democracy, and inter-cooperation, contributed to Electrodomesticos surviving
longer than other companies in the same sector. Managers and worker-members echoed
that if Fagor had not been a cooperative it would have fallen much earlier, and the
consequences for employment in the valley would have been significantlymore dramatic.
The nearly 1,900 cooperative members of the Fagor parent company were offered early
retirement or relocation to other cooperatives of the group:
The [Mondragon] group’s solidarity and inter-cooperation instruments have been
fundamental in protecting jobs. I would highlight the efforts made through Lagun
Aro, such as the relocation of staff to other cooperatives, jointly-funded early retire-
ment, etc. At the same time, various initiatives were put in place to boost people’s
employability by raising their qualifications. (Interview, MCC manager)
4.3 Design and development of regeneration initiatives (2005 onwards)
After decades of tremendous growth that privileged managerial prerogatives and
market orientation, between 2000 and 2002 various large Mondragon cooperatives, such
as Fagor Ederlan,Maier andCopreci, initiated ideological reflections about the core prac-
tices and values of the cooperative model. For example, an Ederlan member explained
this reflection in the following terms:
We came from an intense process of growth that culminated with the opening of a
production plant in Brazil ( . . . ). Themembers of the governing bodies perceived that
it was time to look back. We started a process of ideological reflection, which other
cooperatives in the group also started at the same time ( . . . ). The aimwas to analyze
key aspects of our experience, such as participation and social transformation, and
reflect on what we could do to introduce our [cooperativist] management model into
the group’s [non-cooperative] associated companies. (Interview, Ederlan Governing
Council member)
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These internal reflections that arose almost simultaneously in several of Mon-
drago´n’s most important cooperatives quickly translated to a broader debate. In 2003 the
Mondragon Cooperative Congress – made up of representatives from all the group’s co-
operatives – recognized a general decline in democratic control and the need to revitalize
essential aspects of the Mondragon experience such as participation, inter-cooperation,
cooperative training and education, and the role of cooperatives in promoting positive
social change (Azkarraga et al. 2012). This Congress approved what was called the ‘so-
cial expansion strategy’, based on the extension of cooperative values to the capitalist
subsidiaries via the development of worker participation mechanisms similar to those of
the Basque cooperatives. Some of the crucial agreements reached about the subsidiaries
were to encourage greater transparency in decision making, implement the same par-
ticipative management model as that applied in the cooperatives, aim for at least 30 per
cent of worker ownership, and devote 1–5 per cent of profits to local development in the
territories where the subsidiaries are located (Flecha and Ngai 2014).
These issues are clearly highlighted in the MCC Corporate Management Model
currently in force, which emphasizes three aspects of promoting democratic governance
and participation in the cooperatives: self-management, communication, and corporate
development (Mondragon 2013). The first two of these, self-management and commu-
nication, encompass both the cooperatives and their subsidiaries, whilst the third, cor-
porate development, is fundamentally designed for the subsidiaries. Where the self-
management of cooperatives and subsidiaries is concerned, the Corporation stresses the
design of horizontal organizational structures to facilitate participation and teamwork
and to enable the collective definition of aims and responsibilities. ‘Communication’ fo-
cuses on establishing transparency policies to stimulate interpersonal relations and the
flow of information within the organization, and ‘corporate development’ concentrates
on exporting the cooperative model to capitalist firms.
MCC’s corporate policies on regeneration have subsequently promoted the imple-
mentation of concrete initiatives by many cooperatives, including those of a smaller size
that operate on a local scale. However, at least in the largest international cooperative
groups, regeneration does not tend to follow a detailed, transversal plan that covers all
the dynamics and structures of the organizations; rather, these regeneration processes
overlap and intertwine simultaneously with degenerative tendencies in the cooperatives.
At the constitutional level, some cooperatives have conducted regeneration
projects aiming to transform their domestic subsidiaries into cooperatives. For example,
the Basque subsidiaries Fit Automocio´n and Victorio Luzuriaga Usurbil were integrated
as production plants of Fagor Ederlan, their workers becoming cooperative members of
the parent company. In 2008 the domestic subsidiary Victorio Luzuriaga Tafalla was
converted to a mixed cooperative, and most of its workers became cooperative members
of the new cooperative subsidiary (for a detailed analysis, see Bretos and Errasti 2017).
Maier conducted the same process in 2012 with its domestic subsidiary Maier Ferro-
plast. Similarly, the household appliance components manufacturer Copreci set up a
mixed cooperative subsidiary in 2010 in Altsasu, Navarre. However, various domes-
tic subsidiaries of Ederlan, Maier and other MCC’s cooperatives still remain capitalist
firms.
What is more, no Mondragon foreign subsidiary has been converted to a coopera-
tive or comprehensively introduced the range of management and employment practices
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associated with the cooperative model. The reasons preventing the cooperativization of
foreign plants are complex and varied (for a detailed analysis, see Flecha and Ngai 2014,
Bretos et al. 2018, Bretos et al. 2019). Our informants often emphasized the fact that
in the destination country either no cooperative legislation has been developed, or the
legislation in place bears no similarity to that of the Basque Country. Likewise, they
also echoed the lack of a strongly rooted cooperative culture in many foreign regions
in which Mondragon cooperatives operate. For instance, a manager referred to these
institutional barriers in the following terms:
[The conversion of foreign plants into cooperatives] is very complex. In many coun-
tries where we are located there is no cooperative legislation, or it is very different
from the legislation that exists here [ . . . ]. Nor are there the same cultural speci-
ficities around the cooperative model and labor cooperation that exist in the Basque
Country. (Interview, Ederlan manager)
Many informants also suggested that if foreign plants become cooperatives, their
workers might take the decision to detach from the parent cooperative. In consequence,
worker-members and managers deem the cooperativization of foreign plants as risky
for the viability of the parent co-op business project and the jobs of the Basque worker-
members, thereby generating a dilemma for the ultimate objective of internationaliza-
tion in Mondragon: keeping cooperative jobs at the Basque plants.
At the cultural level, meanwhile, some projects have been introduced to reno-
vate and institutionalize cooperative training and education in Mondragon coopera-
tives. These projects, which are primarily designed and implemented by Otalora, focus
on both business issues and the cooperative culture and social skills such as leadership
and teamwork; however, they are primarily targeted at managers and members of the
governing bodies. Some of our interviewees suggested that there was a deficit in cooper-
ative training and education for grass-roots worker-members (see also Heras 2014). For
example, an in-house survey in 2010 at an Ederlan domestic plant revealed that only
7 per cent of members knew exactly what the Mondragon cooperative principles com-
prise:
I would not say that the [cooperative] training has been enough. In very little time,
very complex aspects are addressed and in a very abstract way [ . . . ]. It takes time to
assimilate issues such as the meaning of cooperative values. (Interview, new Maier
worker-member)
At the organizational level, regeneration efforts and their results have also been
mixed. Some particularly dynamic and innovative cooperatives are experimenting in-
ternally with new forms of participation. This is the case for Fagor Arrasate, which has
fostered more participatory dynamics by opening up spaces for deliberation andmore ac-
tive participation from shop-floor workers. In this cooperative the advisor’s role has been
redefined to not only inform but also energize participation in the mini-councils which
in turn have been reshaped to encourage the advisory role of the Social Council. Simi-
larly, Ederlan has reconfigured the role of the mini-councils to strengthen information-
sharing and has created new channels to broaden workers’ involvement. For instance,
participation in the discussion and elaboration of strategic plans has been expanded to
include members from all strata and hierarchical levels of the cooperative. However, in
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cooperatives such as Ederlan and Maier there are still clear deficits regarding the par-
ticipation of workers at the shop-floor level (see Altuna and Urteaga 2014 for a detailed
analysis of the internal tensions at Ederlan in the 1990s and 2000s regarding partici-
pation in the management of work). The aforementioned in-house survey conducted at
Ederlan revealed that 23 per cent of the workers gave a score of 1 out of 10 for their
participation in the company:
The mini-company model has been showing certain signs of social exhaustion for
some time ( . . . ). We must begin to rethink how to move towards models where self-
management is understood in a more transversal and profound way. (Interview,
Ederlan manager)
Our research also found that regeneration in Mondragon has been strongly sub-
ordinated to the changing market conditions and the associated requirements imposed
on the cooperatives. The political discourses of the late 1970s and early 1980s that
focused on building more horizontal structures and reinforcing self-management were
rapidly abandoned in light of the new competitive and growth requirements imposed by
the growing globalization of markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Taylor 1994,
Kasmir 1996). Similarly, the regeneration discourse of the early 2000s lost momentum
with the arrival of the economic crisis in 2008, which forced the cooperatives to focus on
economic viability and survival:
The impact of the crisis was unexpected and harsh ( . . . ). This forced us to leave
many things aside. The internal discussions shifted to focus on how to safeguard
employment and keep the company afloat and competitive. Our positioning was
to continue growing and investing in RandD, which today has proven a successful
strategy. (Interview, Maier manager)
It seems that the regenerative discourse has changed substantially since the eco-
nomic crisis. The markedly political content of the regeneration plans and discourses
of the early 2000s has given way to a businesslike rhetoric focused on what is called
‘vivencia de los valores cooperativos’ (the lived experience of cooperative values), based
on strengthening cooperative values such as co-responsibility and commitment to en-
hancing cooperatives’ economic viability (Mondragon 2016). This shift is particularly
evident where the transformation of capitalist subsidiaries is concerned:
Our organizational model is clear: here in the Basque Country we are cooperatives,
but not elsewhere [ . . . ]. Introducing the cooperative model abroad is no longer
on the agenda. A few years ago, this was a concern in many cooperatives, but it
is no longer a matter of interest. It arose from the ideological character of the
past, but did not translate into deeds anyway. [The cooperativization of foreign
subsidiaries] was rather part of a discourse of belligerence and orthodoxy. This
would lead nowhere nowadays [ . . . ]. What we emphasize at the subsidiaries is the
lived experience of cooperative values and how to translate them into daily practice.
Values such as responsibility, effort, teamwork, and workers’ loyalty to the company
are fundamental in all our subsidiaries. (Interview, MCC corporate manager)
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5 Discussion
This article was motivated by recent calls to empirically document the evolution
of cooperatives and member-based organizations (Diefenbach 2018) and shed light on
the structural, organizational, and cultural dynamics that cause them to degenerate and
regenerate (Jaumier 2017, Narvaiza et al. 2017). Drawing on a longitudinal analysis, we
illustrate how the evolution ofMondragon’s industrial cooperatives in a capitalist setting
creates an intricate picture that contradicts the highly deterministic and simplistic
degeneration thesis. These cooperatives have thrived for decades in highly globalized
and competitive markets while maintaining, at the very least, the essence of their
democratic methods and governance structures in the Basque Country, as well as their
contribution to job creation, economic development, and social cohesion in the local area.
Our research reveals how cooperatives confronted with a ‘grow-or-die’ dichotomy
in global capitalist markets have to cope with unique constitutional, cultural, and orga-
nizational degenerative pressures which are substantially different from those faced by
small cooperatives operating exclusively in the domestic market. As the literature con-
tends, small organizational size and positioning in niche markets with little competition
from larger capitalist firms are critical conditions if cooperatives are to maintain their
community-oriented purposes and democratic functioning (e.g. Jaumier 2017). Articu-
lating regeneration processes is much simpler for small local cooperatives, as it is easier
for them to enact the collective appropriation of the business project, enhance mutual
recognition and trust, and build social links among their members (Ng and Ng 2009,
Narvaiza et al. 2017). In contrast, regeneration in international cooperative groups is
much more complex due to their large organizational dimension, the severe economic
pressures imposed by competing in global markets, and the fact that they operate across
institutionally and culturally distant countries, which hampers growth following the
cooperative formula and essence (Bretos et al. 2019).
As we have seen, international growth can transform cooperatives into ‘coopitalist’
hybrids (Bretos and Errasti 2018) composed of a cooperative nucleus (parent company)
and a capitalist periphery (subsidiaries) in which non-owner workers are deprived of the
rights and benefits of cooperative membership. To meet global market requirements,
cooperatives may be compelled to put greater power into the hands of technocratic man-
agement at the expense of workers’ control and rank-and-file participation, leading to
the consolidation of oligarchic trends. At Mondragon this tendency has been boosted
by the introduction of dominant regimes of managerialism in the form of mainstream
models of TQM and lean manufacturing (Cheney 2002), which have promoted shallow,
manager-driven forms of participation that are confined to the work area and assessed
in terms of productivity. Lastly, the prevalence of conventional business objectives can
displace socially-oriented goals and reshape cooperative practices in line with manage-
rial priorities. Participation and self-management seem to have lost some of the political
content of yesteryear in favor of job stability for worker-members. Similarly, education
and training policies have shifted to focus primarily on managerial skills and technical
training at the expense of the philosophical, political, and practical aspects of coopera-
tivism. To some extent these changes have been influenced by broader societal changes,
including growing unemployment and precarious working conditions, and more individ-
ualistic behavior in the social, labor and civic spheres of community life (Heras 2014),
and the process of ‘de-ideologization [that] has affected the whole of society and, as
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members of that society, the cooperative social body as well’ (Azkarraga et al. 2012: 78).
Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the key role played by Mondragon’s technocratization
of management and the associated managerialist rhetoric that has distorted cooperative
values, privileging concepts such as quality and customer service, efficiency, growth, and
competitiveness.
At the same time, our analysis demonstrates that cooperatives are not passive
actors, completely subject to isomorphic pressures that will sooner or later inevitably
lead them to stagnate in a state of inaction or become capitalist organizations, as degen-
eration theory would suggest (Webb and Webb, 1921; Meister, 1984). They can mobilize
resources and activate processes of organizational change to revitalize cooperative values
and practices. These include the recovery of countervailing social discourses emphasiz-
ing democracy, social transformation, and community development; the reinforcement
of broad-based participation both on the shop-floor and in strategic management; the
updating and institutionalization of cooperative education and training; and the coop-
erativization of capitalist subsidiaries.
However, our findings do not fit well with the prevalent view of regeneration as
a consistent homogeneous process that pervades all organizational spheres and takes
place in a sequential fashion after degeneration, deactivating all of its consequences (e.g.
Batstone 1983, Rosner 1984). According to the evidence gathered in our analysis, de-
generation and regeneration are not mutually exclusive and can occur simultaneously,
as the study by Vezina et al. (2017) on the life cycle of social innovation in a mature
social economy enterprise also evokes. While some recent studies have acknowledged
that regenerative transitions might not have immediate effects (e.g. Narvaiza et al.
2017, Cook 2018), suggesting the existence of a temporary period in which competing
degenerative and regenerative forces coexist, our analysis uncovers how this conflictual
situation can remain permanently unresolved. Mondragon’s international cooperative
groups have developed some interesting regeneration initiatives by cooperativizing some
of their domestic subsidiaries, updating and institutionalizing cooperative education and
training for managers and members of their governing bodies, and revitalizing certain
employee voice structures to strengthen information-sharing and horizontal communi-
cation, and broaden grassroots participation in some decisions. At the same time, these
cooperatives have continued growing through the acquisition of capitalist firms while
cooperative education and training for rank-and-file worker-members continue to suffer
from a systematic deficit, and participation in the work area continues to be shaped by
dominant, managerially-controlled systems.
The permanent overlap of degenerative and regenerative tendencies is sustained,
at least partially, by the fact that regeneration does not appear to be a consistent process
but is rather contingent on changing market conditions and the associated requirements
imposed on cooperatives. Discussions at Mondragon in the 1980s about reorganizing
work to foster substantial self-management were pushed into the background in the
early 1990s due to the escalation of globalization pressures, leading the cooperatives to
begin a new period of international growth and to introduce new models of work organi-
zation oriented towards customer satisfaction. Similarly, the new regeneration schemes
developed since the early 2000s have been significantly subordinated to the impact of
the global economic crisis and consequent strategies for economic survival and business
competitiveness. What is more, it seems that in recent years MCC’s technostructure
has invested significant effort in remodeling the regenerative discourse, emptying it
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of its political content and adapting it to managerial prerogatives; therefore it will be
important to follow how regeneration discourse and practices evolve over the next few
years.
This picture appears consistent with the paradoxical perspective proposed by some
authors to explain the concomitant existence of degenerative and regenerative tenden-
cies (e.g. Hernandez 2006, Storey et al. 2014). In this view, tensions and internal con-
tradictions are understood as a natural state of affairs, since cooperatives ‘are neither
fully democratic nor oligarchic but sites of continuous and unresolved contestation be-
tween oligarchic and democratic tensions’ (Storey et al. 2014: 641). While we concur, it is
equally evident that this perspective neglects political questions about regeneration in
cooperatives. Why have Mondragon cooperatives cooperativized some of their domestic
subsidiaries while others have remained capitalistic in form and essence, both at home
and abroad? A partial response lies in the institutional and cultural differences between
the Basque Country and other national divides, which may translate into perennial and
unresolvable tensions for Mondragon, since, following the paradox approach, coopera-
tives permanently have to cope with ‘internal contradictions that do not necessarily lead
to resolution, but rather, are everlasting’ (Hernandez 2006: 108). However, we also need
to consider the fact that this global labor hierarchy is essential for Mondragon worker-
members to safeguard their interests and maintain their decision-making power (Bretos
et al. 2019). As Kasmir (2016: 55) succinctly points out, ‘job security, decent pay, and
workplace democracy in the Basque Country rest upon poorly paid and insecure wage
labor elsewhere’. This suggests that cooperatives might regenerate only certain aspects
of cooperative organizational life while maintaining other degenerative tendencies in-
tentionally unaltered so that they can continue exploiting the resources and possibilities
offered by a capitalist market economy.
In light of these critical questions, future studies might explore the links between
regenerative strategies and political questions. In broader terms, combining a paradox
approach with power-aware and politically-informed approaches could be useful to fur-
ther understand how cooperatives manage tensions and internal contradictions at each
organizational stage of the life cycle, and which organizational actors benefit, and how,
from reversing some degenerative tendencies while maintaining others intact.
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